Lazydays Inventory: Trading Beneath Rejected Takeout Supply (NASDAQ:LAZY)


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Investment Thesis

Lazydays Holdings (NASDAQ:LAZY) represents an fascinating alternative for the enterprising or event-driven investor to learn from the tug of warfare between two capital allocators who each consider LAZY is value at least $25/share (present value of ~$12). Both capital allocators are long-term oriented, however short-term traders are fleeing the corporate, evidenced by its ~50% decline from its peak in August 2021. Investors with a long-term view have the chance to accumulate a good enterprise at an inexpensive valuation.



Lazydays Holdings operates Recreational Vehicle (RV) dealerships and provides a portfolio of merchandise / providers for RV house owners and out of doors lovers. It has one reportable section (RV dealership operations) which embody the next:

  • Sale of New and Pre-Owned Vehicles (~90% of complete revenues)

    • New Vehicles: choice of new RVs, core manufacturers that have been offered in 2021 have been manufactured by Thor Industries, Winnebago, and Forest River (~59% of complete revenues)

    • Pre-Owned Vehicles: choice of pre-owned RVs (~31% of complete revenues)

  • Other (10% of complete revenues)

Lazydays is understood nationally as “The RV Authority ®” and operates primarily outdoors Tampa, Florida. In complete, the corporate operates 16 dealerships throughout 10 states. The firm grew to become public through a SPAC (Andina Acquisition Corp. II) on March 15, 2018.


With 19,540,031 diluted shares excellent and a present value of $11.59, the market cap is ~$227M (and with ~$400M liabilities/debt, a complete Enterprise Value of ~$627M). Yahoo Finance is displaying a complete EV of ~$438M, so our quantity could be a bit conservative, however that’s fantastic.

QuickFS (<a href=

QuickFS (LAZY)

On a floor degree, LAZY is extraordinarily low-cost (adjusted utilizing our EV of $627M and diluted market cap of $227M):

  • P/E (TTM): 2.48x

  • P/S (TTM): 0.17x

  • P/B: 227M/206M = 1.1x

  • EV/S: 627M/1,347M = 0.47x

However, it’s vital to take notice that the RV business is fairly cyclical and utilizing final yr’s numbers will most definitely result in low multiples calculated at a cyclical peak. Unfortunately, LAZY’s historic numbers solely return till ~2018 (when it grew to become public), which isn’t lengthy sufficient to find out the earnings energy over an entire enterprise cycle. However, valuation is not the principle crux of the funding thesis.

Insider Ownership + Buying

DEF 14A (<a href=


Insiders personal ~43.4% of the corporate (~6.9% after backing out Christopher Shackelton’s stake, since he’s the co-founder of Coliseum Capital, which owns ~27%). Looking on the insider transactions beneath, the CEO (William Murnane) appears to have a good report of shopping for low and promoting high- he purchased in November 2020 for ~$14 and offered within the $21-25 vary. Coliseum Capital can also be a constant acquirer of the inventory (~$13 and ~$20).

OpenInsider (<a href=

OpenInsider (LAZY)

However, LAZY truly appeared on my radar due to B. Riley’s supply to purchase the corporate for $25/share in money again on March 11, 2022. On March 14, 2022, Lazydays introduced that it rejected the proposal, stating that they consider that the supply “meaningfully undervalues the Company”. The inventory is at present buying and selling at ~$12, a 52% drop from the takeout value. Recently, RILY has acquired one other ~$700K value of LAZY on June 22 (see above).

Those who’ve adopted me know that I believe extremely of B. Riley (see my two write-ups on RILY: Wonderful Company Trading At 4x EBITDA, Yields 6% And Insiders Are Still Buying); they’re good allocators of capital and extremely aligned with shareholders. RILY truly leads us to the crux of the thesis beneath…


The of us at RILY are good capital allocators; in different phrases, they’re opportunistic and like to accumulate belongings cheaply. For instance, in 2016, RILY acquired United Online (client going through dial-up Internet entry enterprise) for $71M in money and inventory; the corporate was (and nonetheless is) in terminal decline, but it surely produces ~$30M+ a yr in EBITDA. In brief, RILY acquired it for ~2x EBITDA and it nonetheless throws off money for RILY at this time that’s getting used for funding new offers.

The undeniable fact that RILY provided to accumulate LAZY and LAZY rejected the supply for $25/share alerts two issues:

  1. RILY sees worth in LAZY and so they consider it’s value greater than $25/share (they in all probability will not be shopping for $1 for $1)

  2. LAZY (extra particularly, Coliseum Capital) sees worth in LAZY and in addition believes it’s value a minimum of $25/share

As a consequence, transferring ahead, there appears to be two in all probability outcomes:

  1. RILY (or another person) acquires LAZY for a minimum of $25/share or

  2. LAZY continues to develop and ultimately grows past the proposed $25/share

Either means, shareholders stand to learn if both of the eventualities come to fruition.

As an additional catalyst, on February 24, 2022, the corporate licensed an extra $45M for repurchases ($20 million can be utilized via July 31, 2022, and the remaining $25 million can be utilized via December 31, 2022) on high of their authentic $25M repurchase that can be utilized via December 31, 2022 (declared on September 13, 2021).


  • Recession Fears: one might argue that the current drop in RV shares (e.g. CWH, WGO, THO) have been in anticipation of a recession, which might dramatically lower the demand for RVs (and the whole lot usually); I might argue that since it’s cyclical in nature, the long-term outlook for RVs shouldn’t be impaired

  • High Gasoline Prices: excessive gasoline costs clearly cut back the demand for RVs, because it dramatically will increase the fee to drive RVs throughout the nation

  • Value Destruction: there may be at all times a nontrivial likelihood for LAZY to destroy worth in its ongoing enterprise operations; nonetheless, this danger is mitigated by Coliseum’s giant stake within the firm, since they’re incentivized to make the funding work; I might argue that that is the largest danger to regulate


LAZY represents an fascinating scenario the place the present value clearly doesn’t signify its true worth; the one query is whether or not the hole between value and worth can shut. I consider that there are forces at play that an enterprising investor ought to have a look at; specifically, an opportunistic, savvy capital allocator providing to purchase LAZY out at a value >100% the present value. RILY continues to build up shares even after LAZY turned down its takeout supply, signaling that they nonetheless consider LAZY is mispriced.

Based on the evaluation above, I like to recommend an extended place in (and cautious monitoring of) LAZY for the enterprising investor, probably as a part of an event-driven portfolio.


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